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Abstract 
The chapter argues for rules to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. But the rules are rule 
like only in imposing forward-looking behaviour, while they allow the discretion to respond to 
shocks. They would serve to anchor expectations, and align private sector actions with desired 
outcomes. Many countries have used rules, but credible rules have to be suited to a country’s 
circumstances, which include both structure and political economy. These aspects help to explain 
past policy choices and outcomes in India, such as the relatively low inflation, even though 
monetary policy was not autonomous. Prices were kept down partly through administrative 
measures and subsidy schemes. This led to distortions that lowered efficiency and growth. The 
constraints need to be stricter for fiscal compared to monetary policy, in order to restrain the 
competitive populism of elected governments. If fiscal-deficit zone targeting restrains 
government consumption expenditure while protecting essential expenditure on physical and 
human capital, it would become possible to lower Indian real interest rates closer to world levels. 
Recent advances in the theory of monetary policy show how the CB can influence the real interest 
rate in the short- to medium-run, taking account of expected inflation in setting nominal interest 
rates while smoothing the latter. Exchange rate policy could also be further fine-tuned to fulfil the 
objectives of stabilising prices, stimulating exports, and preventing a currency crisis. Since 
accountability, in a democratic polity, forces the CB to keep inflation low, a weak constraint on 
the CB, such as medium-term inflation zone targeting, is credible. This would allow productivity 
improvement to decrease inflation, under expanding potential output. 
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 Coordinating Monetary and Fiscal Policies: A Role for Rules? 
 
Ashima Goyal 
The fire restrained in the tree fashions flowers,  
Released from bonds, the shameless flame dies in barren ashes. 
----Rabindranath Tagore 
INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal policy is concerned with government’s tax and expenditure, monetary policy with the 
management of money supply, interest and exchange rate. Both policies influence the national 
output and interest rate; therefore, they can be coordinated to achieve the better outcomes. This 
coordination has both short and long-run consequences, including on the financing of government 
expenditure. However, feasible coordination depends on political forces. This chapter explores 
how monetary and fiscal policy can complement each other in a developing country such as India.  
 Exploring this issue acquires new importance because there are lessons to be drawn from 
recent theoretical ideas and international experience. Countries, which grew rapidly in the 1990s, 
such as the US, China and Ireland managed to coordinate these policies well. Many countires 
have used rules to attain desirable combinations, but, in order to work, the chosen rules have to be 
suited to a country's circumstances. Such institutional change will allow better coordination. 
Reforms blocked by special interests become feasible with such changes. 
India's history, development needs and the political economy influenced past policy 
coordination. The government did not earn as much as it could have from inflation as a tax on 
money balances, because of the political imperative of keeping inflation low in a democracy with 
large numbers below the poverty line. Although before reform the central bank (CB) was not 
autonomous and monetary policy accommodated fiscal policy, revenue from the creation of 
money was not maximized. Even so, money growth exceeded the inflation tax. Prices were kept 
down through administrative measures and subsidy schemes. This led to distortions that lowered 
efficiency and growth. Especially after the oil shocks, essential expenditure on infrastructure and 
social capital was compromised. The revenue deficit and government debt rose to unsustainable 
levels. The long term was sacrificed for short-term populism. It was possible to deceive the 
electorate because large shocks and poor systems made it difficult to be forward-looking. 
How have conditions changed with reforms and opening out? The balance maintained 
between financial credibility and electoral politics was not sustainable after reforms, since the 
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Indian macro-variables had to be benchmarked to the world and efficiency had to be improved. 
Too large a fall in CB financing of the government deficit accompanied liberalization. The rapid 
accumulation of forex reserves caused a part of this problem, as the CB substituted foreign for 
domestic securities in its portfolio. Lower inflation and higher real interest rates in the 1990s only 
increased the burden of government debt. The higher real interest rates also lowered growth. 
Capital mobility and openness posed new challenges, which could be an opportunity, however, 
only if real interest rates are lowered and growth rates raised. 
Populism, bankrupt Governments and lags in its effects have reduced the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy, while more openness and financial intermediation have raised sensitivity to interest 
rates and, therefore, the impact of monetary policy. But in developing countries with huge 
requirements of physical and social infrastructure, public investment continues to be crucial. 
Moreover, market segmentation and backward areas put limits on where monetary policy can 
reach compared to public expenditures. Elected governments in a democracy are more subject to 
populist pressures, while CBs accountable to a democratic policy cannot allow high inflation. If 
rules restrain government consumption expenditure while protecting essential capital expenditure, 
and the CB is bound to keep inflation rates within a band but only over the medium term -- it will 
have sufficient discretion to bring real interest rates closer to world levels while productivity 
improvements lower inflation. 
We conclude that constraints on discretion can improve both, but the constraints need to 
be stricter for fiscal policy as compared to monetary policy. The stricter fiscal rule would restrain 
the competitive populism of elected governments and shift the electorate to a better understanding 
of the long-term consequences of current policy. A major strength of democracy is the public 
accountability of domestic institutions; a weakness is populism and neglect of the long-term. The 
proposed coordination would, therefore, use the strengths but moderate the weakness inherent in 
a democracy. An effective monetary-fiscal policy combination is possible that can stimulate 
growth, lower inflation and asset price volatility, safely use foreign inflows and allow India to 
escape the political economy pressures that have curtailed growth in the past. 
The three major ways in which recent developments have changed macroeconomic 
analysis (Krugman 1998) influence the arguments developed in this paper. First, modern 
macroeconomics is explicitly dynamic. It builds in agents’ strategic decisions, taking account of 
their own and others’ future actions. Rational expectations, or the idea that agents use all relevant 
information in forming expectations, offer a useful tool to analyse such behaviour consistently. 
Second, most modern economies are open to trade and financial flows. This puts exchange rate 
regimes at the centre stage of analysis. Third, the deepening of financial markets has changed the 
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transmission mechanism and impact of monetary policy. Sensitivity to interest rates has 
increased. 
 Ideological battles on extreme postures have give way to focusing on substantive 
questions about real economies and their performance. Different schools are borrowing from each 
other's models. Economists who believed in perfect markets have begun to accept price rigidities, 
in order to explain the data, and Keynesian economists are building-in the implications of 
forward-looking behaviour. In their models, excess demand and cost-shocks determine inflation 
and neutrality of money holds only in the long run. Fluctuations in exchange rates and financial 
markets have made the point that money and financial arrangements do matter. 
While most agents may be forward-looking and have rational expectations in asset 
markets, only a small share of consumers and producers are forward-looking. In developing 
countries, where modern markets do not cover all sections of the population, this proportion can 
be quite small but is increasing with reform. Similarly, only a fraction of wages and prices are 
linked to expected future inflation. The rest respond to past inflation, with a lag. Asset price 
volatility, therefore, tends to be higher to compensate for these rigidities. To take account of the 
forward-looking aspects, inter-temporal accounting and budget constraints are necessary in 
macroeconomic analysis, and explicit arbitrage has to link real and financial rates of return. 
Changes in expected growth or productivity increase, risk perception and anticipated policy 
changes would affect current asset prices and have income and wealth effects, while liquidity-
constrained agents respond to the induced current-income changes. In an open economy, 
foreigner’s expectations also affect foreign capital movements.  
 To attempt to discover an optimal context-relevant policy combination, we first outline 
the theoretical relation between the two in 'The Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal Policies' 
and then 'Political Economy' explores the political economy of the relationship, in the abstract 
and as it has developed over the years in India. 'International Experience' draws on international 
experience in policy coordination and the use of rules. 'Macro-policy and Institutional Change' 
explores the conceptual categories underlying the new thinking on rules and institutions 
impinging on macro-policy. The 'Openness and Interest Rate' section analyses the effects of 
openness, and the 'Conclusion' puts together the lessons for Indian policy. 
 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES IN 
THEORY 
There are different aspects to the relation between fiscal and monetary policy. First, they interact 
to determine output and interest rate in the short-run. The IS (investment equals saving) and LM 
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(equating the demand and supply of money) curves show how the two together affect aggregate 
demand and determine output and interest rates (see Box 1). Monetary policy affects aggregate 
demand through the short-term real interest rate and fiscal policy acts directly on aggregate 
demand. Romer (2000) has recently advocated analysing the problem in the real interest-output 
space rather than the nominal interest-output space as is done in the conventional IS-LM diagram. 
Since CBs act to directly affect the real interest rate, and this is the variable that influences 
aggregate demand, the new IS and MP curves are simpler and more realistic. When CB policy is 
to keep the real interest rate constant-- independent of output-- the LM curve is replaced by a 
horizontal MP curve. In that case monetary policy is used to achieve the desired real interest rate, 
while fiscal policy shifts out the IS curve so that output equals potential output.  
Box 1 
 
The Apparatus for Analyzing Monetary-Fiscal Policy in the Short Run 
 
i 
y 
LM 
IS 
The IS curve shows the combination of nominal interest rate (i) and output (y) such that 
planned spending equals output, that is, investment equals savings. It is downward 
sloping since a fall in i stimulates 
expenditure and therefore raises y. The 
LM curve shows combinations of i and 
y such that the demand for money 
equals its supply. It is upward sloping 
since money demand rises with output 
so the interest rate has to rise to clear 
the money market. The initial impact 
of fiscal policy is on the goods market. 
For example, a rise in government 
expenditure shifts the IS to the right, 
raising i and y.  Monetary policy acts first on the asset market. An expansionary monetary 
policy shifts the LM to the right, y rises and i falls. The intersection of the two curves 
gives the level of y and i, which 
simultaneously clear the goods and 
money market, for a given price level. 
Romer (2000) advocates replacing the 
LM curve by an MP (monetary policy) 
curve. In the simplest version of his 
model, the CB keeps the real interest 
rate (r), fixed independent of y. The 
MP curve is then horizontal. If the CB 
wants to raise r with y it would be 
upward-sloping. This approach reflects 
CB practice, makes it easier to analyze inflation rather than having to assume fixed prices 
as in the IS-LM model, and reduces simultaneity and shifts of the curves. It is beginning 
to be used in modern textbooks. 
MP 
y
r 
IS 
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Second, there are other aspects of coordination. In an open economy, interest rates have 
an immediate effect on demand, but they have uneven effects on different sectors. If, for example, 
exchange rates overreact, they put pressure on producers of traded goods. Fiscal policy can target 
these specific sectors. Lags in fiscal response could be reduced if some fiscal actions are 
delegated to a body outside the government. For example, a 'regulator' responsible for some such 
actions has been established in the UK since the 1960s (Wren-Lewis 2000). 
The third aspect relates to the financing of government expenditure over time. A 
government can either print money or borrow to fund an excess of current expenditure over 
revenue. But either choice has implications for inflation, interest rates and government finances 
over time.1 The government can finance an excess of current expenditure over revenue either by 
borrowing money (issuing bonds) or printing money (seignorage). The CB can change the mix 
between the two through open market operations (OMOs). That is, if the CB buys (sells) 
government bonds in exchange for reserve money it issues, it increases (decreases) the stock of 
reserve money. If the CB prints money and buys government bonds held by the public it 
monetizes the debt and also increases the stock of money.  
 In a stationary equilibrium where major ratios are not changing the rate of inflation 
equals the rate of growth of money. Then the gross fiscal deficit (GFD) which isexpenditure plus 
interest payments minus tax equals seignorage (reserve money balances multiplied by their rate of 
growth), which in turn equals the inflation tax (money balances multiplied by the rate of 
inflation). See Box 2 for definitions. Money balances are held by households and satisfy their 
demand for money. The rate of inflation is the cost of holding money, therefore money balances 
held fall with inflation.  
From this model a number of insights follow. We list the few that later will help us to 
understand the Indian situation. 
1. Zero inflation requires that the value of taxes in excess of expenditure over future successive 
time periods, discounted to the present, must equal current debt. Although the government 
need not do so immediately, over time it has to raise taxes to repay borrowings. 
2. A given gross of interest deficit can be financed by a high or low rate of inflation, since 
seignorage revenue can be the same with high inflation and low money balances or vice 
versa. Under high inflation the cost of holding money is higher, so consumers hold less 
                                                          
1 The natural dynamic benchmark model (see, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) used to examine 
this issue is one based on an inter-temporal budget constraint or a sequence of budget constraints over time, 
for the government. Households maximize lifetime utility from consumption and money balances that 
lower transaction costs. 
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money. However, since money facilitates transactions, consumers have higher welfare when 
inflation is low and money balances held are higher.  
 
r : realized real rate of interest. 
where 
    =  G  -  T  +  rB  
  =  G  -  T  +  (i - π) B 
Or GFD(a)  =  GFD  -  πB 
Adjusted Gross Fiscal Deficit: Subtracts change in G debt due to inflation from GFD. 
G: Total expenditure, T: Total revenue, iB: Interest payments on debt, B. 
where 
or   GFD  =  G  -  T  +  iB 
Gross Fiscal Deficit: Total expenditure minus total receipts (excluding borrowings) of
the Government. 
π: inflation rate calculated from P. 
where 
Inflation tax ratio: GDP
P
M ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛π  
Inflation tax: Total capital loss made by holders or real money balances due to inflation.
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product at market prices. 
P
M : Real reserve money balances; P; implicit GDP deflator; 
gM: Rate of growth of reserve money; 
where 
Seignorage ratio: GDP
P
Mg M ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛  
Box 2 
 
Fiscal-Monetary Variables 
 
Seignorage: Real revenue that accrues to a Government from newly issued reserve
money. 
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3 In standard monetarist theories inflation increases with money supply. In this model, 
however, a decrease in money financing and an increase in bond financing in the initial 
period unambiguously increases the inflation rate. This is because the steady-state GFD rises 
as interest payments accumulate. Sargent and Wallace (1981) derived this 'unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic' which gives a fiscal theory of inflation. This result, however, holds 
only for the case where the government has to borrow to cover the fall in money supply, with 
fixed expenditures and given initial values of variables. If expenditures can decrease along 
with money supply, or taxes can be raised to compensate for the fall in money supply, 
inflation does not rise. If, other things constant, the government commits to the level of 
seignorage or inflation, the only variable left free to adjust in the model is the initial price 
level. Then this becomes a fiscal theory of the price level rather than of inflation. Monetarist 
theories argue that there is nothing to fix prices if money supply is endogenous, but here the 
price level is determinate even under an endogenous money supply with pegged interest rates.  
 
The analysis of financing leads to the fourth major aspect of the relationship between monetary 
and fiscal policy, and this is politics. Political pressures may force particular types of fiscal-
monetary co-ordination. It is the government that has to face elections in a democracy. Therefore, 
fiscal policy normally functions as the leader to which monetary policy has to adjust. The 
government may force the CB to expand money supply to help finance a deficit, thus raising the 
inflation rate. But high inflation hurts the poor who have more votes. It redistributes income from 
the poor to the rich. In a populous developing democracy redistribution claims play a large role. 
Thus, we turn to examining the role of politics on the macro polices chosen in India.  
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY AND POVERTY 
 
Democracies face a tension between financial stability, and the pressures of re-election. CBs are 
responsible for the first, and governing politicians are subject to electoral pressures. In the 
literature, the pressures the latter put on CBs have been explored as the 'inflation bias' or 
dynamically inconsistent behaviour2 of the CB. The CBs, influenced by their government, may 
try to raise output above capacity. Once workers have made their work decisions based on 
                                                          
2 Surveys are available in all recent macroeconomic textbooks. Journal of Economic Surveys (2000), vol. 
14, no.5, is devoted to this issue.  See also McCallum (1997). Other literature on which this section draws 
upon is Alesina and Perotti (1995), Blinder (1997), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Goyal (1999), Jensen 
(1997), Lohmann (1992), Piga (2000), Rodrik (1999), Varshney (2000), and Whitehead (2000). 
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expected wages the CB has an incentive to create surprise inflation and trick them. This lowers 
real wages and unemployment since firms are then willing to employ larger numbers. But over 
time such behaviour becomes anticipated, higher nominal wages adjustments are built in, so there 
is only excess inflation, with no decrease in unemployment.  
In a poor populous democracy, however, without indexation of wages and prices in the 
large informal sector, inflation hurts the poor who have the most votes. Therefore, democratic 
accountability also acts to force the CB to keep inflation low. CBs are accountable if they are 
partially independent. Too much independence can reduce democratic accountability. One way to 
prevent this is to allow instrument but not goal independence. Thus the government can set the 
goal (for society) and the CB be left free to implement it using its special professional 
competence and knowledge. Ultimately institutions cannot be divorced from politics. The CB 
would be forced to share society’s preferences, especially in bad times.3 Empirical evidence on 
monetary policy also suggests that the importance of CB independence is overstated. Many 
countries have low inflation without fully independent CBs. Moreover, Central Bankers 
themselves and many economists who have worked closely with them say that CBs do not want 
to generate trick inflation. They are worried about their reputation, and are naturally conservative.  
If excess inflation occurs it is because of an inability to distinguish between shocks or because of 
imperfect knowledge of the economy.  
More than the CB it is the fiscal authority that is tempted into excess populist 
expenditures. In a democracy with a large number of poor a larger weight is given to the present, 
and the short-term view prevails4. User charges and administered prices are not raised, especially 
after supply shocks to oil prices, and subsidies rise. The revenue deficit and public debt can 
balloon, distorting resource allocation and reducing public investment in infrastructure and 
human capital. Thus in a democracy like India, we would expect to find a CB that accommodates 
                                                          
3 Even strong Central bankers recognise their vulnerability. Thus Paul Volcker, then chairman of the 
Federal Reserve said, 'the Congress created us and the Congress can uncreate us” (quoted in Furman and 
Stiglitz 1999). He was echoing a sentiment expressed by Burns in 1976, 'In our democratic system the 
independence of a governmental agency can never be absolute' (quoted in Whitehead 2000). In 2001 
Thailand's respected CB governor Chatu Mongol was sacked following a public dispute over interest rates.  
Mongol had repeatedly refused to raise Thailand's low interest rates, annoying Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. The new CB governor, Pridiyathorn Devakula, outlined another set of monetary measures, 
including a proposed increase in interest rates (news reports). 
 
 
4 The fiscal illusion view of the 'public choice' school expects public debt to rise in a democracy. 
Institutional features such as elections based on simple majorities rather than on proportional voting, one 
major party, absence of coalition governments, a powerful finance and prime minister, and vote on the total 
budget before voting on its allocation can guard a democracy from such fiscal decay. We argue that these 
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fiscal needs, but uses administrative measures are used to keep inflation low. More autonomy to 
the CB can, without changes in the rules of the game and fiscal reform, lead to higher real interest 
rates that increase the burden of public debt and lower growth. Since a democratically 
accountable Central Banker in a developing democracy would tend to keep inflation low, stricter 
rules are required to restrain a populist fiscal authority and allow the CB to stimulate growth.  
Democratic voice allows local tacit institutions and interests to develop, as reflected in a 
wide variety of robust and efficient institutions. Some empirical cross-country exercises suggest 
that democracy leads to higher quality of growth, survives shocks better, and there is less 
volatility and inequality. Others find that democracies grow at middling rates; there is neither 
boom nor bust. Therefore, there is scope for conscious design of institutions that support 
development better. The monetary and fiscal policy choices made in India show the influence of 
democracy and poverty. 
  
Events in India 
 The relatively closed, import substitution and public investment driven model of development 
followed, allowed macro-policy to be geared towards domestic requirements. The monetary 
authorities were not independent of the fiscal; there was automatic monetisation of deficits. But 
India is also a democracy. The mandate of the government was growth with rapid reduction of 
poverty. Redistribution, or 'who gets what', is a part of the political process in a democracy. 
Different groups successfully lobbied for subsidies. This should have put pressure on government 
budgets and led to increasing reliance on seignorage. Inflation is an easy-to-collect tax and it 
increases savings by redistributing in favour of higher saving classes. But where more than half 
the population were below the poverty line and an even larger percentage had no social security 
or other protection against inflation, governments concerned with re-election could not afford 
high inflation. Thus, even though there was some positive seignorage revenue and automatic 
monetisation of the deficit, commercial banks’ ability to multiply the reserve base and create 
broad money was partially countered through draconian compulsory reserve and statutory 
liquidity requirements. This, together with administered prices, restrained inflation to politically- 
acceptable levels. Although the Reserve Bank was not independent, its democratic accountability 
forced it to control inflation.  
After the cost shocks of the 1970s-- since user charges were not raised for many public 
services-- revenue deficits rose. There was large public borrowing for consumption. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
features may not be sufficient to prevent public debt accumulation after major supply shocks such as the oil 
shocks. 
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Government’s ability to fund much-needed infrastructure was seriously compromised. Thus, 
political business cycles in India largely took the form, not of increased money creation, but of a 
cut in long-term development expenditures and interventions that distorted allocative efficiency. 
The future was sacrificed to satisfy populism in the present5 (Goyal 1999).  
With the reform of the early 1990s the delicate balance achieved between democratic 
accountability and credibility of the monetary regime was disturbed. Credibility acquires a larger 
weight in a more open economy. India’s inflation rate, although low by developing country 
standards, was higher than the world rate. It had to be brought in line to reassure mobile global 
capital. Moreover, the fiscal-monetary combination followed in the past was not sustainable, as 
public debt had risen. Thus more autonomy was given to the Reserve Bank, the repressed 
financial regime was dismantled, interest rates became more market determined and the 
government began to borrow at market rates. The informal nominal money supply targeting, 
which the Reserve Bank had been following, proved inadequate under these changes; interest 
rates were volatile in the 19909s, and the Reserve Bank moved towards using the interest rate as 
an instrument, basing its actions on a number of indicators of monetary conditions (Jalan 2001). 
The other major change in the 1990s was the higher level of foreign inflows-- these now 
accounted for a growing share of reserve money. Reserves of foreign currency accumulated, and 
were sterilized by a contraction of Reserve Bank credit to the government, and OMOs. The latter 
became possible by the mid-1990s because of the financial liberalisation of the previous decade; 
the debt market was deepening and government debt could be traded at market-determined rates. 
But as real interest rates rose and growth rates fluctuated, government debt burden increased. The 
nominal exchange rate was now managed rather than fixed. Nominal depreciation was allowed in 
order to prevent real appreciation, but the exchange rate was not allowed to appreciate in nominal 
terms. There was occasional excess volatility, but a crisis was avoided. Even contagion from the 
East Asian crisis was averted. However, growth rates were lower than potential. And 
improvements in policy, rules and institutions are required to enhance growth.  
 
Outcomes of choices 
Next we turn to the data. Figure 1 shows the rate of growth of money and inflation, the rate of 
seignorage and inflation tax from 1970 onwards. Box 2 explains how these are calculated and 
Table 1 gives the annual averages for the 1980s and 1990s. The main facts are discussed below, 
and inferences drawn.  
                                                          
5 This argument is related to the fiscal illusion view of the 'public choice' school, but unlike the latter it can 
explain why fiscal decay would intensify after oil shocks. Indian democracy had a number of institutional 
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Table 1 : Annual Average Values of Monetary and Fiscal Indicators 
Decades Reserve 
money 
growth rate 
Inflation 
(implicit GDP 
deflator) 
Seignorage/
GDP 
% 
Inflation 
tax/GDP 
% 
Real 
interest 
rate on 
G debt  
GFD/
GDP 
(%) 
GFD 
(adjusted)/
GDP 
% 
1980-1 to   
1989-90 
16.84 8.4 2.54 1.25 1.44 7.24 2.96 
1990-1 to 
1999/200
0 
13.86 8.09 2.25 1.31 4.07 6.15 1.56 
Notes: * Implicit GDP deflator from EPWRF (1998), but from 1996-7 calculated from 
WPI, average of weeks, 1993-4 base. 
Source: RBI (2000), EPWRF (1998), Economic Survey (GOI 2001). 
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features that succeeded in guarding it from fiscal decay before the shocks. 
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1. The average seignorage ratio has remained at between 2-3 per cent of GDP, low by 
developing country standards. 
Democracy and sensitivity to inflation ensured that India’s ratio is much lower than past 
ratios in many developing countries. Fischer’s (1982) calculation of average seignorage for India 
in the 1960s and early 1970s was only 1 per cent, compared to 2.3 per cent for other developing 
countries. In developed countries this ratio is less than 1 per cent. Inflation rates and, therefore, 
seignorage generally rose after the oil shocks of the 1970s. Peak hyper-inflationary rates of 
seignorage in Latin American countries have exceeded the rates that would have maximised 
inflation tax.  
2. India’s average inflation tax is about half the average seignorage ratio. The inflation 
rate is also always below the rate of money growth. The volatility of money growth and 
seignorage exceeds that of inflation and inflation tax.  
This points to administered prices and low user charges that have systematically kept the 
inflation rate below that of money growth. In part, of course, financial deepening and 
development increases the demand for money balances, allowing them to be absorbed without 
inflation. The picture of volatility (Figure 1) suggests that reserve money was difficult to control 
and there was considerable inflation inertia.  
3. Policy was able to bring down inflation rates after peaks associated with oil shocks, but 
seignorage rose in every decade, before falling in the 1990s. 
Indian macro-policy was able to lower inflation rates, when many developing country 
governments could not, perhaps because governments in a poor democracy are forced to control 
inflation. Average seignorage went up steadily but with considerable annual fluctuations, from 1 
per cent in the 1960s, 1.85 per cent in the 1970s, and 2.54 per cent in the 1980s before falling in 
the 1990s. Massive monetary expansion and inflation were avoided, but administrative controls 
played a major role in smoothing inflation. 
4. Seignorage has been less than the maximum possible.  
The curve relating the rate of seignorage to the rate of money growth is called the Laffer 
curve. It is bell-shaped. Seignorage starts to fall on the downward slope since money balances 
held fall at high rates of inflation. The rate of money growth, which maximises tax revenue, lies 
at the peak. Maximum seignorage is inversely related to the inflation elasticity of the demand for 
money. The scatter points of Indian data all lie on the upward slope of the potential Indian Laffer 
curve (Figure 2). The inflation tax has been lower than seignorage, but seignorage itself has fallen 
far short of the maximum revenues that could have been raised by printing money. 
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5. The average contribution of printing money to government revenues has been 6 per 
cent of total government revenues including reserve money.  
The distortions in relative prices required to keep inflation tax lower than seignorage had 
a large cost in terms of lower efficiency and slower capital growth. There has also been a large 
loss of potential government revenue, as user charges of many public goods were kept below 
cost, although this was partly compensated by higher seignorage. Given India’s low tax/GDP 
ratio and tax base, the 6 per cent contribution of seignorage to government revenues is quite 
substantial. 
Figure 2: On the Upward Slope of the Indian Laffer Curve
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Figure 3: Adjusting the fiscal deficit for inflation
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6. The inflation-adjusted fiscal deficit is substantially lower than the ordinary fiscal 
deficit, but the gap has been narrowing in the 1990s with a fall in inflation rates. The average 
weighted real interest rate on government debt also rose in the same decade. 
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Since the government is a net debtor, the real value of its repayments falls with inflation. 
Therefore, the nominal GFD does not correctly measure the change in real debt, that is, of what 
the government owes in terms of real goods. The inflation-adjusted fiscal deficit gives a much 
more true picture of the fiscal position. Figure 3, which graphs both the ordinary and the 
inflation-adjusted GFD, shows how much lower the latter is. To that extent the real claims on the 
government are lower and the deficit is more sustainable. The gap between the two, however, has 
been narrowing in the 1990s, as nominal interest rates on government borrowings have risen and 
the rates of inflation have fallen. Figure 3 and Table 1 also show the weighted real interest rate on 
government securities; this has clearly risen in the 1990s, and partly explains why interest 
payments account for about half of revenue expenditure. Sustainability of public debt requires the 
real interest rate to be less than the growth rate. Therefore, both high real interest rates and low 
growth rates increase the debt burden. Lowering the real interest rates would stimulate demand 
and also improve the fiscal deficit.    
 
Figure 4: The share of government and 
foreign assets in reserve money 
0 
50 
100 
150 
70/71 74/75 78/79 82/83 86/87 90/91 94/95 98/99
Net foreign
exchange assets
of  the RBI
RBI credit to the
Government and 
open market 
operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15
Figure 5: Credit shares of the government and 
the private sector 
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7. In the 1990s the share of reserve money growth due to accumulation of forex reserves 
has gone up substantially (Figure 4) and that due to RBI credit to the government has gone down, 
while the share of the commercial bank credit to the government has gone up (Figure 5). 
 
Moving towards market-determined interest rates for government securities has coincided 
with a period of large foreign inflows. Open market operations were also activated since the mid-
1990s. Table 2 shows the effect on some key averages over the last two decades. Sterilised forex 
asset accumulation meant that the government had to turn to commercial banks for a larger part of 
its borrowing requirements, thus putting pressure on the interest rate, and widening the revenue 
deficit. Seignorage does not change if foreign reserves account for a larger share of reserve 
money, but funding of the government deficit does change. Foreign reserves exceeded US$40 
billion in 2001. 
 
Table 2 : Monetary Consequences of Opening Out 
 (annual average values)
Decades Ratio of RBI 
Credit + Open 
Market 
Operations to 
Reserve 
Money (RM) 
% 
Ratio of Net 
Foreign Assets 
of the RBI to 
RM 
% 
Share of G 
securities in 
other bank 
credit 
Share of 
commercial 
credit in 
other bank 
credit 
Change in forex 
reserves as a ratio 
of current account 
of BOP (+, 
increase) 
1980-1 to 
1989-90 
92.29 10.67 21.04 78.96 -0.069 
1990-1 to 
1999-2000 
66.30@ 37.88 29.53 70.47 1.734* 
Notes: * For 1990-1 to 1998-9; @ OMOs were negligible earlier, but over 1995-2000 net 
sales of G. securities and treasury bills were an average annual value of 6.06% of 
Reserve Money 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI (2000). 
 
Conclusion 
The data tell us the government did not earn as much as it could have from inflation as a tax on 
money balances, because of the political imperative of keeping inflation low in a poor democracy. 
Although before reform the CB was not autonomous and monetary policy accommodated fiscal 
policy, seignorage revenue was not maximized. Even so seignorage and money growth exceeded 
the inflation tax. Prices were kept down through administrative measures and subsidy schemes. 
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This led to distortions that lowered efficiency and growth. The revenue deficit and government 
debt rose to unsustainable levels. However, liberalization was accompanied by too large a fall in 
monetisation of the government deficit, raising the possibility of 'unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic'.6 The rapid accumulation of forex reserves caused part of the problem, as the Reserve 
Bank substituted foreign for domestic securities in its portfolio. These inflows can be an 
opportunity, however, if real interest rates are lowered and growth rates raised. Lower inflation 
and higher real interest rates of the 1990s have been increasing the burden of government debt. 
Higher real interest rates also lower growth.  
The data support the hypotheses that the pressures of democracy, poverty and openness 
have determined the combination of monetary and fiscal policy followed in India. These 
pressures have also prevented the policies from working together fully to complement each other. 
International experience shows that institutional change, which will allow better coordination, is 
feasible. 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
In the 1990s, America achieved just what India has been trying to do without success, over the 
past decade. Their budget deficit, which had mushroomed in the eighties, was converted into a 
surplus while the economy prospered. How did they do it? Four factors made this achievement 
possible (Blanchard 2000; Goyal 2000b). First, an expansionary monetary policy complemented a 
restrained fiscal policy. Second, rules that bound government expenditure were adopted. Third, a 
cut in defence expenditure provided some leeway. Fourth, there was good luck in the shape of a 
booming economy. The good luck, of course, helped by good policy.  
Steep tax cuts by supply-siders in the Reagan era were expected to stimulate output. But 
the expected increase did not occur, and since there was no equivalent cut in government 
expenditure, the deficit grew rapidly. It fluctuated around a peak ratio to GDP of 6.1 per cent in 
1983. Volcker, the Chairman of the Fedreal Reserve, had moved to a high interest regime to 
lower inflation, by the late 1970s. Neither the rise in interest rates, nor the cut in taxes, had the 
desired effect of reducing government spending. The high interest rates led to capital inflows, 
strengthened the dollar, and increased net imports, so that a trade deficit was added to the budget 
deficit. It incidentally also provoked the Latin American crises as capital flowed out of those 
countries to the US. When Clinton came to power in 1992 there was consensus that the deficit 
                                                          
6 Rao (2000) argues that an optimal degree of monetisation would avoid Sargent’s unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic. The RBI’s successful managing of the public debt in the last years of the 1990s counters critics 
who argue that India’s public debt is too high for maneuverability.  
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had to be reduced, but the economy was just emerging from a recession. The new Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, Greenspan, implicitly agreed to support Clinton’s measures to reduce the 
deficit, with an expansionary monetary policy. The latter would ensure that the economy was not 
plunged into a recession with the expenditure cuts. Average interest rates on one-year government 
bonds fell from 7.3 per cent in 1991 to 3.3 per cent in 1994. The economy entered a sustained 
expansion, which lasted through the 1990s. Inflation was also low. The deficit ratio fell steadily 
from 4.7 in 1992 and had turned into a surplus by 1998. Thus, this combination of monetary and 
fiscal policy worked, while the opposite, tried in the 1980s, failed.  
Second, legislative rules helped reduce the deficit. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Bill 
passed in 1985, set yearly ceilings for the deficit with a target for a zero deficit by 1991. It had 
some effect, but creative accounting --because of design flaws (including overstrictness) -- 
prevented the realization of the target. The Bill also lost credibility because a very large deficit 
was required to fund the 1990 crisis in savings and loan institutions. Therefore, it was replaced by 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which corrected the design flaws shown up by experience. 
First, rather than restrict the deficit itself, constraints were placed only on spending. Caps that 
enforced small reductions in discretionary spending were set, but escape clauses were provided 
for emergencies. A 'pay-as-you-go' rule meant that new transfer payments to individuals could be 
made only if these transfers were demonstrated to have assured funding so that they did not 
increase deficits in the future. In a recession, as revenues fell, the deficit could increase, since 
restraints only covered spending. This macro-stabilization provided another escape clause. Such 
flexibility lowered pressure to break rules, gave the Act more credibility, and contributed to its 
success.  
There is general agreement that US monetary policy had been quite successful over the 
past fifteen years. Clarida et.al. (1999) point out that the Federal Reserve was highly 
accommodative in pre-Volcker years: on average, it let real short-term interest rates decline as 
anticipated inflation rose. Volcker and Greenspan took a proactive stance; systematically raised 
real as well as nominal short-term interest rates in response to higher expected inflation. The US 
experience suggests that monetary policy should use interest rates rather than monetary 
aggregates as instruments. Although clear articulation of the CB’s goals is desirable, constraints 
that dictate how the goals should be achieved are not desirable. 
McKibben and Vines (2000) argue that phased-in and pre-announced Fiscal contraction 
can have positive effects since forward-looking adjustments dominate negative current Keynesian 
effects. The US experience of the 1990s is one example of this. Blanchard (1997, 2000) gives 
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another: the contrast between the two Irish deficit reductions in the 1980s. The first, which 
focused on tax increase did not lead to a credible belief in lower future budget deficits; growth 
fell and deficits did not improve. The second, which was based on cuts in spending and tax 
reform, had a favourable effect on expectations and output.7   
Another country that successfully coordinated monetary and fiscal policy for high growth 
was China. Although there were stop-go cycles, tax reform allowed monetary policy to 
accommodate huge government expenditure on infrastructure. 
A new feature of the 1990s is the adoption of fiscal and monetary rules. Other countries 
following expenditure rules are the Netherlands and Sweden. The Euro area (under the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty), Canada and Switzerland follow deficit and debt rules, while the UK, Australia 
and New Zealand impose only transparency requirements on governments. More than a dozen 
developed countries follow Consumer Price Index (CPI) based inflation targeting, while among 
developing countries, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel, Poland and South Africa have 
adopted it (IMF 2001). The 1990s have been a period of falling inflation and fiscal deficits for 
most countries, including those who did not follow rules. The real test of these rules will come 
when times turn adverse. 
In the UK, Australia and France the Chancellor or Minister of Finance makes strategic 
monetary policy decisions; the CB acts as the executive to carry out these decisions. Although the 
CB is independent of the executive in the US and West Germany, there are political pressures 
(Goodhart 1989) even though a number of checks and balances have been designed to contain 
them. In the US these include provisions covering the tenure of the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve and there is a requirement for the Chairman to report to Congress every six months. The 
minutes of the board’s monthly meetings have to be published after a six-week time lag. These 
procedures aim to ensure the principle of political accountability while protecting the monetary 
authorities from the electoral politicians (Whitehead 2000). Transparency, along with checks and 
balances, can achieve these aims even without rules. It is also essential to enforce rules. Details 
vary from country to country, but similar principles apply.  
 
MACRO POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. 
Ideal macro policy procedures, for a developing country, should be robust to imperfect 
information about the economy, and should be able to withstand political pressures that favor 
short-term populism at the expense of long-term growth. We explore some such procedures first 
                                                          
7 Blinder (1997) warns that these observations may be too few to conclude that contractionary fiscal policy 
can have expansionary effects. 
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for fiscal then for monetary policy, drawing on considerable recent international experience and 
work on macro-policy. Readers who want to avoid conceptual details can go straight to the final 
policy conclusions in the last section.   
 
Fiscal policy 
In a democracy it is the government which moves first and, therefore, determines what monetary 
policy is feasible. Populist pressures fall more directly on an elected government. There is a 
strong temptation to give handouts in the short run, as well as huge requirements for productive 
government expenditures on infrastructure and the development of human capital. Constraints on 
fiscal policy that prevent the first, assure the latter, and allow complementary monetary policy, 
are required. 
Result 1 (f): A fiscal responsibility act (FRA) can prevent the occurrence of a revenue 
deficit.  
Such an act would restrain unproductive populism, by curbing the tendency to increase 
government consumption and transfers for consumption on the basis of borrowed funds. 
Result 2  (f): If there already exists a large revenue deficit, reductions should be phased in 
gradually, and backloaded.  
A credible programme for reducing fiscal spending has even stimulated output, in some 
stabilization episodes, by inducing favorable private sector expectations (see Section 
'International Experience'). As conditions improve, tougher steps can be taken. Therefore, 
backloading-- or imposing higher cuts in the future-- allows maximum gain for minimum current 
pain. Hard-to-reverse structural reforms that remove fundamental causes of deficits are preferred 
to excessively stringent macroeconomic policies that can cause a political backlash and, therefore, 
cannot be sustained.   
Result 3 (f): Automatic non-discretionary stabilizers should be built in, with escape 
clauses for unforeseen large shocks. 
If the FRA takes the form of phased caps on spending rather than on the deficit, the 
deficit could increase in case of economic slowdown when revenues fall, thus allowing automatic 
macro-stabilization, and increasing the political feasibility of the scheme. The deficit should be 
allowed to vary over the cycle, that is, it should be cyclically adjusted. Such stabilizers will 
reduce populist pressures and delays and both clauses will improve credibility. They will also 
improve transparency and communication, since the finance ministry will have to clearly explain 
and justify its actions and inactions.  
 20
Result 4 (f): Capital expenditures that raise future revenue by increasing potential output, 
should be protected from cuts and kept at maximum feasible levels, together with incentive based 
reforms that improve the efficiency of such expenditures. 
Such a rule would allow essential development expenditures to be met, improve their 
design and outcomes, and favorably affect private sector expectations, since gaps in physical and 
social infrastructure are recognized as a severe constraint on development. 
Result 5 (f): An acceptable zone should be set for the fiscal deficit, it should be brought 
to the border of this zone, and further reductions be allowed to occur naturally with the fall in the 
revenue deficit and higher growth.    
This fiscal deficit zone targeting is analogous to inflation zone targeting, which is 
analyzed in greater detail. It permits the maximum stimulus to development, consistent with 
restraining government consumption, debt, and unproductive expenditures. Such an Indian Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (FRA) is urgently required. It would allow optimal coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies, suited to Indian conditions. The link between fiscal and monetary policy over 
time as already discussed, needs to be modified slightly for India. The Government should 
commit not to a level of seignorage, but to a level of revenue expenditure. A delicate balance 
between financial credibility and democratic accountability could then be maintained in a way 
that increases choices and opportunities for all participants.8 As interest rates fall and growth rises 
the government debt/GDP ratio would fall. But the FRA currently proposed does not satisfy any 
of these principles. It imposes reductions on both the revenue and fiscal deficit, and on retiring 
government debt, without any backloading, automatic stabilization or features to improve 
incentives. If the targets are not met, a pro-rata cut on all expenditures is to be imposed without 
protecting capital expenditure. The Act has not yet been legislated, but is not very credible as it is, 
and has, therefore, not enthused the markets. As growth slows and there are clear signs of excess 
capacity in industry, fiscal stabilization measures may be warranted. 
Worldwide monetary policy has been gaining importance compared to fiscal policy, as 
financial markets deepen and expectations play a greater role. How can monetary policy become 
more effective in India?  
 
 Monetary Policy 
                                                          
8 See Whitehead (2000). If a robust system suited to country features is designed it would avoid the 
fragility associated with reform based purely on 'hope and imitation, rather than experience (p. 10)'. Both 
capital and labour would gain. Capital’s bargaining power rises in an open economy, while a closed 
economy can follow Keynesian policies favouring labour. 
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Clarida et.al (1999) in a comprehensive survey of recent developments in the theory and practice 
of monetary policy lay out a set of the major new results available.9 It is useful to adapt the ones 
which are relevant in the Indian context. The results are based on simple IS (investment equals 
savings) curve and Phillips curve (PC), derived from rigorous optimisation by agents with 
foresight. These foundations make the model robust. Since they are forward-looking the IS and 
PC curves differ from standard formulations.  
The IS curve relates the output gap or excess demand inversely to the real interest rate, 
positively to expected future demand and a demand shock. The PC curve relates inflation 
positively to the output gap, to future expected inflation and a cost-push or supply shock. The 
output gap is defined as the gap between actual and potential output. The instrument that the CB 
uses is the interest rate. The PC relates inflation to the output gap, and cost-push, rather than 
unemployment. This makes it relevant to Indian conditions because even though it is difficult to 
measure unemployment, the output gap can be defined for India. The idea of potential output and 
expected future changes in it are useful for an economy undertaking structural reform. Second, 
cost-push factors play a dominant role in inflation.  
Such a PC is derived assuming a certain probability that administered and other prices 
will remain fixed in any period. When a price is varied, it is set as function of the expected future 
marginal cost. A proportionate relationship is assumed between the output gap and marginal cost. 
A cost shock, then, is anything that disturbs this relationship. Such deviations can occur due to 
wage contracts or mark-up shocks. In this basic workhorse, the authors systematically examine 
the effect of different CB objective functions and monetary policy arrangements. If the CB wants 
to reduce the output gap, inflation and its variability, then some relatively robust results are the 
following:  
Result 1 (m): A short-run trade-off between inflation and output variability arises only if 
there is positive cost-push inflation. 
When cost-push is zero only current and future demand cause inflation. The CB can then 
vary interest rates to set excess demand to zero for all time and lower inflation with no cost in 
terms of output, which remains at its potential. A fall in output is required to lower inflation only 
if cost-push is positive. 
                                                          
9 Papers representing the variety of work done in this area can be found in Mankiw (1994), Taylor (1999), 
and volume 16(4) of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy with a summary by Allsop and Vines (2000). 
Other papers on which this section is based are Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Goodhart (1989), Hendry 
and Mizon (2000), Mishkin, (1999), Svensson (2000), and Taylor (2000).  
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Result 2 (m): As long as there is cost-push inflation and deviations of output from 
potential may harm welfare, optimal policy would aim to achieve an inflation target only over the 
medium-term.  
Under a positive cost shock, forcing an immediate reduction in inflation would have a 
cost in terms of output foregone. Therefore, inflation should converge to its target only over time 
if there is a positive weight to output stabilization. These two results bring out the importance of 
cost-shocks, which are a major determinant of inflation in a developing economy. 
Result 3 (m): Under certainty, when expected inflation is positive, optimal policy should 
raise real interest rates. While optimal policy should perfectly offset demand shocks, it should 
keep nominal interest rates constant under shocks to potential output.  
Real rates should rise to contract demand when inflation is because of a rise in demand, 
since there is no cost in terms of output in this case. That is nominal interest rates should respond 
more than 'one-for-one' to expected inflation. If there is a rise in potential output, since it is 
foreseen, permanent income and demand will both rise, so expected inflation will be zero, and 
there will be no need to change interest rates. 
Result 4 (m): Under commitment to a rule, the Central banker will raise nominal interest 
rates relatively more compared to Result 3 (m), when expected inflation rises. 
The reason is that a tough credible policy today will decrease the output cost of lowering 
inflation tomorrow. Even if the CB is not trying to raise output above the natural level and there 
is no inflation bias, there is a gain from commitment to an inflation target, when agents are 
forward-looking. Since it influences agents’ expectations, a rule can lower the costs, of 
disinflation, even in a developing democracy. 
Result 5 (m): Since information on current variables is imperfect, policy rules have to be 
formulated in terms of forecasts of target variables. 
All CBs work with imperfect information, due to inadequate data or unknown policy 
lags. Good structural models are required to produce these forecasts. Prior to adopting formal 
targeting rules, a developing country CB must start producing regular forecasts of potential target 
variables and see how they perform.  
Result 6 (m): Model uncertainty can lead to interest rate smoothing; the instrument is 
varied less than required by the optimal policy response. 
A more serious kind of uncertainty is imperfect understanding of the way the economy 
works-- leading to parameter uncertainty in models. This problem is particularly acute in a 
developing country. Under uncertainty, neither expected inflation nor permanent income or 
potential output is perfectly foreseen, and it is difficult to distinguish supply from demand shocks. 
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Central bankers worldwide tend to smooth interest rates. Smoothing means that the desired 
interest rate change is not accomplished at one go, so that a series of small changes follow in the 
same direction, like Greenspan’s famous consecutive interest rate cuts. It is as if CBs add a 
lagged interest rate term, with a coefficient of about 0.8-0.9, to the optimal policy response 
function. This may be due to conservatism or 'status-quoism' caused by uncertainty or concern 
about the financial sector. The latter is particularly sensitive to variations in interest rates. Thus 
model uncertainty leads to making less than full use of forward-looking behavior in designing 
policy, in order to collect more information as well as lower asset-price volatility. Excess 
volatility of asset prices, where forward-looking behavior dominates, is partly due to rigidities 
elsewhere, and also because asset portfolios cannot be fully diversified. 
The short-term interest rate mainly affects capital flows, exchange rates, and other asset 
prices. It is the longer-term interest rates that affect aggregate demand. Smoothing short-term 
interest rates can lower volatility in asset prices and yet allow the CB to directly affect demand 
through the long-term rate. If the short-term interest rate is expected to rise in the future, for 
example, the long-term rate will rise more. So the long-term rate can be affected with a smaller 
current change in the short-term rate. 
Interest elasticities of demand have been observed to be low, but more recent studies 
report significant interest rate effects on domestic expenditures as deeper financial markets spread 
effects more widely. Globalization and financial innovations are occurring at a rapid pace even in 
emerging market economies. Interest rates play a larger role in the transmission of monetary 
policy, and become the natural instrument10 of monetary policy, although other channels of 
transmission, such as credit, continue to be important. (a) Interest rates become more flexible and 
responsive to CB intervention; (b) the interest rate becomes a more sensitive and fast signal of 
potential imbalances; (c) demand for broad money becomes unstable and enhancement in its 
supply from commercial banks more flexible, so that targeting monetary aggregates becomes 
difficult, and the attempt causes high volatility in interest rates; and (d) the size of foreign 
exchange, bond, equity and other asset markets rises. These are very sensitive to interest rates. 
Now forward-looking behavior becomes more important and markets are interested in guessing 
the CB’s response to uncertainty and changes. Thus, transparency becomes a major issue.   
Result 7 (m): If inflation is within an acceptable zone policy should target output; 
otherwise policy should bring inflation to the border of the zone and then let it fall with favorable 
supply shocks. 
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 The argument for smoothing the nominal interest instrument reinforces that for inflation-zone 
targeting. With the latter, sharp changes in interest rates are not required. If the welfare cost of 
small departures from target output is higher than that of inflation from its target, inflation zone 
targeting is a better choice. Moreover, it is suited to a developing country. It allows the discovery 
of potential output. There is a high degree of uncertainty attached to the latter, and it changes 
more as reforms raise efficiency. With a medium-range inflation zone target, changes in potential 
output reveal themselves. If inflation does not rise even as output exceeds the expected potential, 
the potential must have risen. Thus inflation targeting allows focus on domestic considerations 
and response to shocks. The concept of core inflation allows the first round effects of supply 
shocks to be excluded from the target, and there are escape clauses for very large supply shocks. 
The inflation rate-- when excess demand is zero or output equals its potential-- is called core 
inflation. 
In a developing country, a monetary conditions' index can be a precursor or complement 
to more formal inflation forecasting. It is a weighted set of variables that affect aggregate 
demand. The set and weights vary across countries but include money and credit aggregates, 
short-term interest rates, exchange rates and their fluctuations, direct measures of domestic 
inflation, commodity prices, wages and even some real variables such as capacity utilization. It 
was difficult to forecast inflation credibly under the large oil shocks, but low and smooth inflation 
has been a worldwide feature of the nineties. Committing to a rule is not as effective as having 
kept one’s word in the past. If inflation is smooth, developing countries can gradually build up a 
reputation with forecasts that turn out to be correct most of the time. As financial systems deepen 
and segmentation is reduced they can turn to full inflation zone targeting. But transparency and 
open discussion is a pre-requisite to increase understanding about the issues and to co-opt the 
private sector. Major improvements in information and communication technology (ICT) make 
transparency and productive debate more feasible. 
The rhetoric of inflation targeting has disguised its reality; it is not really a rule, but 
allows considerable flexibility. The rule is actually constrained discretion, since it determines the 
behavior of the interest rate as 'a predictable function of a few economic variables' (Allsop and 
Vines 2000, p.17) and is rule-like only in enforcing forward-looking behavior. Since it is 
transparent, private sector jump variables such as asset price expectations help in its 
implementation. Since it is forward-looking, it prevents the CB from taking actions with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 The very successful Bundesbank and Swiss National Bank have operated on money supply, the major 
alternative to operating on interest rates. But they were flexible and gave weight to other concerns.  
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undesirable long-term consequences; the transparent discussion educates the public about these 
long-term effects and, therefore, has political benefits.11 It forces both the CB and the public to 
understand the long-term consequences of choices made and, therefore, to forego short-term 
opportunism and populism. But there is discretion to deal with unforeseen circumstances. It is not 
necessary to impose politically unacceptable short-term costs. Especially as the inflation target 
refers to a medium to long-term range, it gives considerable opportunity for short-run 
stabilization. If the floor is taken as seriously as the upper target, it implies stimulus of the 
economy in order to raise inflation, if demand falls. Since a positive inflation rate is targeted for, 
rather than a price level, real wages can adjust even if nominal wages are rigid.  
A medium-term inflation zone target is consistent with short-run stabilization, and 
longer-term saving, investment and external balance. In developing countries, the latter aspect is 
very important; arrangements must facilitate a rapid rise in imperfectly known12 potential output 
and also disarm the political pressures that harm the future for the present.  
Result 8: In a small open economy the nominal interest rate instrument can be smoothed, 
and the intermediate target real interest rate can be achieved under a managed real exchange rate. 
In a small open economy optimal monetary policy depends on the nature of transmission 
through the exchange rate channel. This is discussed subsequently. However, in a typical 
developing country with a managed exchange rate, the effect of the exchange rate on inflation and 
capital flows and its role as an asset-price dominate. In these circumstances, varying the nominal 
exchange rate in a target band around the real exchange rate can make it feasible to smooth the 
nominal interest rate instrument and achieve the desired intermediate target real interest rate. In 
such an economy, the latter will often be the level that maintains the desired level of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
OPENNESS AND THE INTEREST RATE  
Even in a developing economy, the CB can influence interest rates. In such an economy, a larger 
percentage of prices are administered, and, therefore, fixed in the short-run. If all prices are not 
flexible and money supply rises, real money balances change in the same direction as the change 
in nominal money supply. Money demand falls with the nominal interest rate. The latter is the 
sum of the real interest rate and expected inflation. Expected inflation can be backward-looking 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bernanke and Mihov (1997) argue that the procedure they followed was equivalent to an interest rate rule. 
11 Eichenbaum (1997) argues that he is sure that agents are forward-looking; and if they are not dynamic 
macroeconomics should be taught to all high school students. Then they would become forward looking! 
More seriously, such behavior is a function of the stability and predictability of the environment. As this 
increases so will the ability of agents to anticipate the future. 
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and determined by past inflation, or forward-looking and rise with money supply. In both cases 
money supply exceeds demand and the real interest rate must fall. In the latter case, since money 
demand falls by more, a smaller increase in money supply is adequate to decrease the real interest 
rate. It is, therefore, possible for the CB to change real interest rates as an intermediate or short-
run target.  
Goodhart (1989, p. 293) in a wide-ranging survey of the actual conduct of monetary policy 
writes:  
Academic economists generally regard (open market) operations as adjusting the quantitative 
volume of the banks’ reserve base, and hence of the money stock, with rates (prices) in such 
markets simultaneously determined by the interplay of demand and supply. CB practitioners, 
almost always, view themselves as unable to deny the banks the reserve base that the banking 
system requires, and see themselves as setting the level of interest rates, at which such reserve 
requirements are met, with the quantity of money then simultaneously determined by the 
portfolio preferences of private sector banks and non-banks.  
 
Thus it is necessary to move from the LM curve, with its idea of a monetary aggregate which 
is controlled, to the idea of monetary policy controlling a real interest rate. We saw that this is the 
variable that clears the money market in the short-run, and affects demand for goods. Actual 
operating procedures focus on interest rates and not on monetary aggregates. 
But what is the effect of openness? Under perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate 
money supply becomes endogenous and the world real interest rate determines the interest rate. 
But capital mobility is rarely perfect especially in the short-run, so that in the short and medium-
run the interest rate can focus on domestic concerns. The very fact of reserve accumulation and 
sterilization shows that some independence is available to monetary policy. A managed exchange 
rate gives further degrees of freedom in determining domestic interest rates. The CB also has 
enormous power in affecting expectations and risk perceptions. Even if it is not able to fully 
control money supply, its power has increased.  
Although in a developing economy-- with many backward sectors barely penetrated by 
modern financial systems-- monetary policy has poor reach compared to fiscal interventions, 
more openness greatly raises the impact of monetary policy, in two major ways. (a) as agriculture 
becomes a traded good, the nominal exchange rate affects agricultural prices; this affects wages 
and prices throughout the economy, since food is a major part of the consumption basket; (b) the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 As Blanchard (1997) remarks, macroeconomists know very little about the medium-run, about what 
determines changes in productivity and potential output. This is a major question open to research. 
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exchange rate is an asset price that is very sensitive to interest rates and the expectations of 
domestic and foreign traders, and arbitrageurs. But how to use exchange rates most effectively? 
Box 3 
Monetary Transmission Channels 
• Aggregate demand  
- Real interest rate  
M↓  ⇒  r↑  ⇒  I↓  ⇒  AD ↓  ⇒  Y↓ 
- Credit 
M↓  ⇒  Credit↓  ⇒  I↓  ⇒  AD↓  ⇒  Y↓ 
- Exchange rate (floating) 
M↓  ⇒  r↑  ⇒  NFI(r)↑  ⇒  ε↓  ⇒ AD↓  ⇒ Y↓ 
 
• Expectations 
- Inflation expectations 
↑⇒↑⇒↑⇒↑⇒↑ ++ iWM ttet 11 ππ  
      -    Wealth expectations 
M↓  ⇒  Equity prices        I↓   
        ↓  ⇒  ⇒  Y↓ 
  Wealth       ε↓ 
 
   
• Cost shock from the exchange rate 
- Own exchange rate 
M↑  ⇒  Et↑  ⇒  CPIt↑  ⇒ πt↑ 
      -     External rates 
iw↑         ⇒ Intermediate goods prices ↑ ⇒ WPIt+1↑ ⇒ πt+1↑ 
     ⇒ Et↑ 
Ew       ↑⇒↑
↑⇒↑⇒ +
+
+
1
1
1
t
t
t
t P
W
CPI π  
Notation 
AD : Aggregate demand 
M : Money Supply 
r : Real interest rate 
I : Investment 
Y : Output 
NFI : Net foreign inflows 
ε : Real exchange rate 
E : Nominal exchange rate Rs/US$
Ew : World nominal exchange rate 
iw : World nominal interest rate 
e
tπ  : Expected inflation 
Wt+1: Wage in t+1 
CPI : Consumer price index 
WPI : Wholesale price index 
Pt+1 : Implicit GDP deflator in t+1 
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In a large mature economy the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission works through 
and is subservient to the interest rate channel. The mature floating exchange rate system insulates 
macro-policy from the external sector. If the real interest rate rises, higher capital inflows tend to 
appreciate the real exchange rate and lower demand. In a small, open or emerging market 
economy the exchange rate has other major effects on the transmission mechanism,13 (a) 
imported goods affect the CPI and hence CPI inflation with a shorter lag than the aggregate 
demand channel. CPI inflation zone targeting imparts importance to the exchange rate, which has 
a large impact on consumer prices in an open economy.14 This is true especially once agriculture 
becomes a traded good; (b) it affects intermediate goods prices; (c) wage-price setting, which 
may work with lags or be forward-looking; (d) the exchange rate is also an asset price, which 
directly brings in the effect of monetary policy on forward-looking expectations; and (e) shocks 
to foreign prices, demands and risk premia also have an impact (see Box 3). 
Exchange rate targets have been followed by many developing countries over some 
period but have not done well. Such a target is normally a fixed or a crawling peg. It has the 
advantage of serving as an explicit nominal anchor fixing the inflation rate for traded goods. In 
particular, pegging the exchange rate of a high inflation country to that of a low inflation country 
can serve as a credible commitment to low inflation. But the disadvantages are: giving up 
autonomy of domestic monetary policy; transmission of external shocks as domestic interest rates 
change with foreign; real appreciation that harms exports; and suppression of feedback on the 
monetary policy stance from sensitive forex markets (Mishkin 1999). A pegged exchange rate can 
encourage domestic firms to make excessive short-term international borrowing, resulting in 
financial fragility and crises. The perceived risk for foreign investors is also lowered. If emerging 
market currencies only depreciate over time as the pegged rate is adjusted downwards, this 
provides a safe one-way bet and encourages speculation. Moreover, more open and unified 
financial markets have lowered the effectiveness of direct credit controls. 
Exchange rate policy has three objectives in a developing economy: price stabilisation, 
stimulating exports and preventing a currency crisis. Utilizing the exchange rate channel, as part 
of medium-term inflation zone targeting, could help to achieve these objectives in a small, 
emerging economy. The specific intervention would depend on major transmission channels in 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Svensson (2000)and  Mishkin, (1995). Ceccheti (2000) and Taylor (2000) all point out 
that other ways in which the exchange rate affects outcomes need to be taken into account in designing 
policy for a small open economy. 
 14 The current weight of essential commodities (mainly food) in the CPI is 48.83 compared to 17.63 in the 
WPI (Economic Survey, GOI 2001). Normally 4-6 per cent is regarded as an acceptable rate of inflation for 
India in view of the many administered prices. Farm support prices are the administered prices that have 
been consistently raised. If these are stabilized at world prices Indian inflation rates can fall.   
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the economy. Most exchange rate regimes fall in between pure floats or pure fixed exchange 
rates. If the exchange rate is managed in a band centered at the equilibrium real exchange rate, the 
nominal exchange rate could be varied in the short-term, to stabilise CPI inflation since traded 
goods have a major impact on inflation. The band will make it possible to avoid large fluctuations 
in the nominal interest rate instrument. This, together with smoothing short-term interest rates, 
will lower volatility of asset prices, but allow sufficient variability in nominal interest rates to 
reach the target real interest rate.  
 
Box 4 
 
Smoothing r in An Open Economy 
 
Romer (1999) extends his MP analysis to an open economy. In the short run, capital 
mobility is less than perfect. Since the loss in foreign exchange reserves (RL) rises as the 
real interest rate, r, falls, there is a level of r at which RL is zero. Under managed 
exchange rates CBs fix the real 
exchange rate ( )ε . Then, 
( ) )()( rNFINMrRL −= ε . Overall net 
foreign inflows (FI) which are an 
increasing function of r must equal net 
imports (NM). FI equals net foreign 
inflows (NFIs), plus reserve loss RL. 
Therefore, RL is a downward sloping 
function of r in Figure. It equals the 
difference between total purchases 
from foreigners (of goods, services, 
and assets) and total sales to 
foreigners. The CB looses reserves if it 
is positive. Here, r* is the interest rate at which RL is zero, and NFI = NM. There is a 
basic asymmetry in that reserve loss cannot continue to be positive for long; but reserve 
gain (-RL) can continue indefinitely. At r > r* reserves will be accumulating. There, once 
the desirable level of reserves has been reached, the CB can lower r to the r* at  which 
RL = 0. 
0 RL 
RL(r) 
r 
r* 
Figure 1 
 
Romer (1999) shows (see Box 4) how ensuring that reserve accumulation is zero after the 
desired level of reserves is reached, would fix the real interest rate. In a developing country, 
output is normally below potential and the potential itself can be greatly expanded. Keeping real 
interest rates at the minimum feasible, which is the world real interest rate, would stimulate 
demand, growth of potential output, and ensure positive returns to savings. Thus there is 
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movement in the direction of achieving all the objectives of establishing low rates of inflation, 
stimulating output and exports, and discouraging financial crises. 
Table 2 shows that Indian forex reserves have increased more than three times, as a ratio 
of the current account deficit, compared to what they were in the eighties, and Table 1 that Indian 
real interest rates have been much higher in the nineties. It is possible for India to lower real 
interest rates and the level of reserves. While reserves are more than adequate for import cover, 
they can never be adequate for a crisis. Confidence against the latter can also come from joining 
supportive swap arrangements among CBs such as many Asian countries are entering into; they 
will boost each others' reserves in the event of a crisis. New financial products can also serve to 
make reserves available in times of need. For example, in 1998, Argentina purchased liquidity 
insurance as a contingent repo option. Fourteen international banks were involved (Goyal 2000a). 
Finally, a good exchange rate regime serves a preventive purpose. After the East Asian crisis this is a 
key research area. Random two-way variation within a band will encourage hedging and prevent 
self-fulfilling one way bets on the direction of movement of the rupee and major fluctuations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We now draw together the main conclusions and policy implications arrived at in the course of 
the analysis. First, for fiscal policy, then monetary policy, and finally the two together. A fiscal 
responsibility act should be adopted but it should focus on backloaded reductions of the revenue 
deficit while protecting capital expenditures, automatic stabilization and incorporating escape 
clauses. This is what we call fiscal-deficit zone targeting: after the fiscal deficit reaches an 
acceptable zone, further reductions should be allowed to come through growth. This policy set 
will make coordination of monetary and fiscal policy in the shortrun and resolve the dilemmas of 
long-run financing of government expenditure. 
If legislation is enacted to restrain the revenue deficit and shift the composition of public 
expenditure towards investment, then openness gives an opportunity for monetary authorities to 
lower Indian real interest rates closer to world levels. The real interest rate can be kept around the 
level at which the desired level of foreign exchange reserves is maintained. Such a policy set 
would not increase the inflation rate. Since accountability, in a democratic policy, forces the CB 
to keep inflation low, a weak constraint on the CB -- such as medium-term inflation zone 
targeting -- is credible. Under such a constraint, inflation has to be maintained within the 
predefined zone over time. The zone stabilizes inflation expectations, so that the cost of dis-
inflation is lower. Thus, measures to change aggregate demand would be required only if inflation 
is outside the zone; otherwise productivity improvements can be allowed to decrease inflation in 
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their own time, under expanding potential output. This gives sufficient discretion to smooth 
nominal interest rates and achieve the desired real interest rates. Smoothing nominal interest rates 
lowers asset price volatility. 
In most countries of the world today monetary policy uses a short-term nominal interest 
rate rather than money supply as the policy instruments. Recent advances in the theory of 
monetary policy have developed an analytical framework suited to this trend. The instability in 
money demand, with the availability of close substitutes, has made control of monetary 
aggregates ineffectual. Moreover, it is the real interest rate that affects the demand for goods. 
Thus, while the short-term nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, the real interest rate is 
the intermediate target. As long as prices are not perfectly flexible the CB can influence the real 
interest rate in the short to medium-run, taking account of expected inflation in setting nominal 
interest rates. 
Exchange rate management can also help to allow domestic interest rates to depart from 
world rates if it becomes necessary, and help to smooth nominal rates by lowering the need for an 
interest rate defence of the currency. The nominal exchange rate will also, in the future, have a 
major impact on food prices and the CPI. Exchange rate management can, therefore, contribute 
towards reducing inflation. Oil price shocks and rising agricultural support prices have 
contributed to inflation in the past. WTO-induced agricultural trade liberalization gives an 
opportunity to stabilize food prices without alienating the farm lobby. Some prices will rise as 
administered prices are freed, but restructuring and gains in productivity can compensate to some 
extent. Managing the exchange rate in a band around the real equilibrium rate will encourage 
exports. Thus exchange rate policy can fulfil its three objectives in a developing economy: price 
stabilization, stimulating  exports and preventing a currency crisis. 
Rules embodying constrained discretion in macro policy will allow the strengths of 
democracy to be used and compensate for its weakness. Since such rules make long term 
consequences of policy clear, they help to align private sector actions with desired outcomes, 
make society more forward-looking and reduce the popularity of short-term populism. 
Transparency and good communication are both a prerequisite and a beneficial side effect of such 
rules. The favourable effect on expectations can actually allow a rise in demand to accompany 
short-term government consumption expenditure cuts. The stimulation of the economy that they 
result in is what makes them feasible and credible.  
  The mix of monetary and fiscal policy affects important issues of medium-term 
macroeconomic balance, such as between saving and investment, or internal and external balance; 
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moreover, in a developing country the mix must facilitate a rapid rise in potential output. Both 
fiscal and monetary policies can work together to stimulate higher growth and lower inflation.     
Since populism has had more adverse effects on the government budget, while it has 
pushed monetary authorities towards keeping inflation low, stronger rules should insulate the 
government from populism. The ideal mix should make a virtue of uncertainty -- by letting those 
who have the most information, act within bounds that deflect them gently towards better 
outcomes.  
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